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THE HISTORICAL STAGE OF 
GERMAN CAPITALISM 
-- AN ANALYSIS OF THE BISMARCK REGIME--
By Eiji OHNO" 
Prologue 
The subject matter of my report is to elucidate the historical characteristics 
of German capitalism which was one of the forces driving a prodigious turn in world 
history in the transitional process during the period of the "Great Depression" at 
the end of the 19th centuryll, so to speak, from the world of Marx's "Capital" to 
the world of Lenin's "Imperialism". The period of this "Great Depression" began 
during the crisis of1873 and lasted up to the mid-1890's, almost for a quarter of a 
century'l. Just in those days the basic composition of the Bismarck Regime (1871-1918) 
which was created by the unification of Germany in 1871, came to be carried out 
to its full extent, but at the same time its many contradictions came to be aggrava-
ted in the midst of this "Great Depression", and with the fall of Bismarck in 1890 
as the turning point this Regime was obliged to suffer the process of collapse. 
The aim of this report is not to analyze the "Great Depression" itself, but to 
>II' Professor of Economics, K yota University 
1) This essay is a revised version of the essential points of my report originally prepared for one 
part of the common subject entitled "The Stage of the Great Depression at the End of the 19th 
Century viewed from the Aspect of World History and its Fundamental Composition", for the 
Autumnal Science Convention of the Agrarian History Society (TOCHISEIDOSHIGAKKAI) 
for the year 1969. 
2) Vgl. Hans Rosenberg, Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit, Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik 
ill Mitteleuropa, Berlin 1967, SS. 25 ff. In this connection, grasping the "Great Depression" according 
to view of recurrent long-time alternations of the "Long Waves" such as prosperity-period during 
1849-73, depression-period during 1873-96 and prosperity-period during 1897-1914, Rosenberg 
arrested attention with his contention that the "Great Depression" was not a local event only in Eng-
land, but was an international common phenomenon which was experienced in Europe and America 
as well. But the basic question to be raised here, is how to grasp the characteristics of the crises 
which arose from the inten.5ijied aggravation of the co-existence of unbalanced develojJments of the national 
economies of the various countries during the period of those depression days, I.e. problematic charac-
ter of the crises brewing on top of inflammable raw materials of worldwide-scale in the "Age of 
Imperialism". About this point, see Eiji Ohno, German Capitalism, Tokyo 1965, Introduction 
"Social Basis of Crises". About the characteristics of the "Great Depression" at the end of the 
19th century, see Masaharu Tokiwa, Studies on the Agricullural Crises, Tokyo 1966, Chapter 2, 
Agricultural Crises at the End of the 19th Century and the Character of Economic Crises in the 
Early 20th Century. 
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grasp the historical characteristics of the social structure ofImperial Germany which 
existed for nearly half a century from 1871 to 1918, i.e. to ascertain the characteris-
tics of the Bismarck Regime. Although we think that the Bismarck Regime has 
some historical characteristics which be defined as "pseudo-Bonapartism", what I 
intend here, is to present some problems for further discussion by showing how we 
analyzed the social structure ofImperial Germany in actuality, with respect to subjects 
such as whether or not it is possible to describe the characteristics of the Bismarck 
Regime as "pseudo-Bonapartism" as one of the varieties of absolutism, or in other 
words, "what kind of task for social change had to be raised in the process 
of the November Revolution and the formation of the Weimar Republic?" 
I The Historical Position of the Bismarck Regime 
To begin with, it is necessary to determine the historical position of the Bis-
marck Regime in the course of development of German capitalism which was an 
industrial latecomer. There would be no objection, I should think, in stating that 
industrial capital was established in Germany during that period; then a transition 
from the stage of industrial capital to that of monopoly capital or finance capital, 
or to that of imperialism took place; and it was the very period of the said "Great 
Depression" that formed a watershed between these two stages. Now, the problem 
at issue lies in making clear how such a course of development of German capitalism 
took place, in other words, in what particular form was the general law of capital-
ism made to penetrate? i.e. the historical type !if its penetration. 
(l) The Establishment of German Industrial Capital 
The first point to be examined is concerned with the very way in which the 
establishment of German industrial capital is to be grasped. It may confidently 
be said that the results of various recent studies in this country about the German 
industrial revolution are of such extremely varied kinds that they may well be re-
presented as being in a kind of nebular state'}. However, for the time being I 
should like to summarize them in the following way according to my own view. 
It seems possible to assume that the starting period of the German industrial 
revolution can be sought in the days when the development of the home market 
came to be made due to formation of the German Customs Union (Der deutsche 
Zollverein) in 1834, after passing through the period of primitive accumulation of 
the "Prussian type" through the acceleration of bourgeois reform initiated "from 
above" (von oben), making its start from the "peasant emancipation" (Bauernbe-
freiung) by Stein and Hardenberg after 1807. Needless to say, it was observed that 
both the manufacturing and factory s)'siem had been mixed up before this tiITle, and it was 
3) Minoru Morota, "Development of the Industrial Revolution in Germany: A Sketch based on 
the Latest Studies", The Review of Economics and Commerce (SHO-KEI RONSO) , Vol. 3, No.1, 1967; 
and Eiichi Hizen, "On the Pattern of Industrialization in Germany", The Journal of Agrarian His-
tory (TOSHISEIDOSHIGAKU), No. 39 (Vol. X, No.3), 1968. 
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impossible to determine the "manufacturing period proper" and still harder to 
find out a precise turning point when the transition was made from the manufacturing 
to the factory system. Nevertheless I should like to attend to the process in which 
the immaturity of spontaneous conditions for the transition to the factory system was 
forced to be substituted and supplemented by the formation of the Customs Union 
"from above", 
The terminating period of the German industrial revolution can be sought in those 
days of 1870's when the products of modern mechanical industry came to determine 
the social value of the goods') -- in this case the textile industry, and particular-
ly the cotton industry, each of which was the kind of the industry which played the part 
of the main axis of the industrial revolution, giving rise to a problem to be disput-
ed -- and the machine industry that secured the fitting foundation of production 
technique which made modern mechanical industry stand on its own feet, and above all 
the machine tool industry came to be in full operation5 ). As a criterion we can 
point out the foundation of the Reichsbank in 1875 when the consolidation of a 
new credit system was expedited as a finishing touch of the Industrial Revolution. 
A whole credit system essentially centering around bank capital, which might well 
be defined as the specifically German type of bank (Der spezifisch deutsche Banktyp) 
was consolidated, culminating in the operation of the Reichsbank6 ). Moreover, 
"the alliance between the East Elbe and the Rhine"'), which was aimed by the 
upper class of the Rhine bourgeoisie like Gustav Mevissen, was realized not under 
the initiatives of the Rhine, but rather adverseiJI under the initiatives of the East 
Elbe'). 
Now, as for the social carriers of the German industrial revolution, I am of 
opinion that three "types of capital" can be detected. According to the results 
of the history of such studies'), the type of commercial entrepreneur (Der Verlagsunterneh-
mer), which was principally found in the weaving industry, had its ubiquity during 
4) Vgl. Friedrich Engels, "Vorwort zur zweiter, durchgesehenen Auftage »Zur Wohnungsfrage«", 
in: Karl Marx·Friedrich Engels· Werke, Bd. 21, Berlin 1962, S. 330. 
5) For instance, the machine industry in Berlin grew to be able to compete against the British 
machine industry in the days when the new German empire was established, and established its 
dominance in the field of modern mechanical industry. See E. Ohno, op. cit., p. 236. 
6) E. Ohno, A Study on the Genesis of German Finance Capital, Tokyo 1956. 
7) Helmut B6hme, "Grundung und Anfange des Schaaffhausenschen Bankvereins, der Bank 
des Berliner Kassenvereins, der Direktion der Disconto-Gesellschaft und der (DarmsUidter) Bank 
fur Handel und Industrie", TraditionoZeitschrift fur Firmengeschichte und Unternehmerbiographie, 10. 
Jahrgang 1965 4. Heft, S. 199. 
8) About the point that the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership as a result of Big· 
marek's so-called "revolution Crom above" during the period 1966-71 became to be a decisive im-
petus to incorporate even the Rhine bourgeoisie into the hierarchy of Prussian society, see Friedrich 
Zunkel, Der Rheinisch-Wes!fiilische Unlernehmer 1834-1879, Kiiln und Op1aden 1962, S. 130. 
9) Vgl. Heinz Sachtler, Wandlungen des industriellen Unternehmers seit dem Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts, 
Dissertation Halle 1937, S. 7; Tomoo Matsuda, Basic Stu«y on German Capitalism, Tokyo 1 967, 
pp. 65-71. 
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the "period of the pre-March Revolution"; overwhelmingly so in Eastern Ger-
many and extensively so in Southern and Western Germany. The type 'If engineer 
entrepreneur (Der Technikerunternehmer), which was mainly found in the spinning 
industry developed extensively during the "period of the pre-March Revolution", 
and it too was the type formed generally in Southern and Western Germany and 
particularly in the Rhineland. The type 'If aristocratic entrepreneur (Der grundherrli-
che Unternehmer), which was found in an antediluvian combination of three kinds of 
managements such as mining and manufacturing administrators, farm land owners 
and forestry owners, was a typical type found particularly in Upper Silesia in South-
eastern Germany. This type may be classified into the following two sub-types 
-- one type of entrepreneur that clearly indicated the direction of the breaking 
down of antediluvian combined enterprises in those days when the new German 
empire was established like Corporation of Count Renard, "Die Minerva, Schlesi-
sche Hiitten~, Forst~ und Bergbau~Gesellschaft", and another type of entrepre-
neur that maintained antediluvian combined management which characterized 
the administrations by landed magnates (Magnaten), up to the times of the col-
lapse ofImperial Germany by holding the regalian rights (Bergregal) i.e. the mining 
privileges and also by shifting the emphasis of mining and manufacturing operation 
from iron to coal or zinc, like the privileged enterprising group of Count Henckel 
-- a group of enterprises which was defined by Max Weber as a specific represen-
tative of "Starostenindustrie" (vassal industry) 10) or as "Pertinenzen der Guts-
bezirke" (adjunct of Estate Districts) 11): the latter of these two sub-types command-
ing the more dominant position than the former. 
Now, the German industrial revolution, though basically being driven by the 
type of engineer entrepreneur, did come to establish industrial capital under the 
predominance of the type of commercial en trepreneur, involving therein the op-
position between the uprising of the former and the confrontation of the latter, in such 
a manner that the transition of manufacture towards the factory system did not 
eliminate the way of forming a new factory system caused by the transformation 
of antediluvian capital into industrial capital, i.e. the dominance of the type of com-
mercial entrepreneur and the type of aristocratic entrepreneur. In this specific 
way in which German industrial capital came to be established, there lies the very 
reason why an extensive continuance of the so-called "combination of agriculture 
and industry" 12) operating at the bottom of the social structure was permitted, 
and at the stage where a modern mechanical industry had a dominant influence, 
this combination i.e. the foundation of relative happiness which labourers used 
to. enjoy was transformed into that of mercilessly low wages. It was this extensive 
10) Max Weber, "Agrarstatistische und sozialpolitische Betrachtungen zur FideikommiBfrage in 
PreuBen (1904)", Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Soziologie und SoziaJpolitik, Tubing-en 19241 S. 353 
Anm. 
I I) Ibid., S. 342 Anm. 
12) F. Engels, op. cit., S. 332. 
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social stratum of the old middle classes itself that should be regarded as the principal 
social basis of the social structure of "pseudo-Bonapartism" and for this reason we 
should pay attention to the fact that "twofold compositions of the industry" came 
to be formed in such a way. 
(2) The Foundation of Monopolies in Key Industries 
In this way, while at the bottom level of society there remained the old mid-
dle classes in stagnation to an extensive extent, a progressive advance if the industrial 
composition was accelerated and at the same time the gigantic scheme of monopoly 
capital came to be in operation at the beginning of the 20th century, passing through 
the period of the "Great Depression", based on the progressively higher organic 
composition of capital in the key industries, taking the course of unbalanced develop-
ment such as a rising in the department of the means of production and a stagna-
tion in that of the articles of consumption. 
Now, firstly let us see the coal and steel industry. In Western Germany like 
Rhine-Westphalia and Lorraine-Luxembourg, 24 "mixed works" (gemischte 
Werke) i.e. combined management produced some 23% of the total coal output 
of the German empire which amounted to about 120 million tons in 1903 and 
some 73% of the total pig iron output which amounted to about 10 million tons; 
"mixed works", in which successive production processes in the fields of coal and ore 
mining, iron and steel manufacture, rolling and machine making, etc. were verti-
cally combined together, composed the nucleus of the commanding monopoly in the 
coal and steel industry in Western Germany, the fact of which could well be indicat-
ed by the establishment of the Second Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate in 1903, 
the Pig Iron Syndicate at Dusseldorf in 1897 and Steel Works Federation (Stahl-
werksverband) in 1904. Besides a number of production agreements and price 
agreements were concluded during the period of the "Great Depression", not to 
speak of Coal Export Union in 1877 and the Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate 
was established in 1893 which carried an epoch-making significance in the history 
of the centralization of capitals in the coal and steel industry in Western Germany. 
Thus it was made possible to recognize the formation if, so to speak, premature monopoly, 
all the facts of which lead to an aspect that the problem of monopolized mine-lots lying 
in the background of the market control as one of its causes should be taken up 
for our further consideration. 
Because the owenership of mining-lots is separated from land ownership under 
the so-called principle of the primacy of the mining right owner and the mining 
capitalist generally is the owner of mining-lot, any surplus-profit accruing from 
the owned mining-lot is not separated as mining rent, without being handed over 
to the landowner; both of mining rent and profit arc combined together without 
being separated and belongs to the mining capitalist. Thus, because mining 
rent, namely in this case differential rent due to the different fertility between 
better mining-lots and worse ones, has an important meaning in so-called "profits" 
of mining capital, it follows that the principal target for the mining capital is 
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directed toward the security of the surplus-profit by acquiring better mining-Iots l3l . 
Because of the intervention of the problem relating to the monopoly of mining-lots 
which come to be raised in such way, there ;s a possibility that the discrepancy of 
concentration and centralization of mining capital becomes considerably accelerated, 
in fact of which we can find one of the factors leading to the formation of pre-
mature monopoly. Moreover, since the "mixed works" became the main axis of 
monopoly to play its commanding sway, which were produced from the blending 
of processes of concentration and centralization of capital in the field of the coal 
mining industry and the iron and steel industry as well, taking the form of "tied" 
coal-mines (Zechenhiitten) where certain coal mines were combined with certain 
steel works or "tied" steel works (Hiittenzechen) where certain steel works were 
combined with certain coal mines, it was natural that the said problem of mono-
polized mining-lots lying in the background of their market control should not 
leave the formation of monopoly by the coal and steel industry without giving 
a certain branding in any shape. 
At Upper Silesia in Eastern Germany about 10 "mixed works" had command-
ing control of some 24% of the total coal output and some 8% of the total pig 
iron output of the German empire at the beginning of the 20th century. This kind 
of "mixed works" was none other than that antediluvian combined management 
which was spontaneously produced on the basis of the landownership of a few of 
the landed magnates (Magnaten) and Prussian Exchequer (Preu/3ischer Fiskus). 
What composed the background of such antediluvian combined management by 
operators of mining and manufacturing industries like coal, lead, zinc, iron, steel, 
etc. and owners of farm land and forestry was the very ownership of colossal land-
ed estate (Latifundium) fixing into the "Fideikommi/3" (entailed estate) which 
had a mining privileges (Bergregal) deserving to be called as "a state within a 
state"UI, wherein the semi-feudal production relations of Junkerdom in the East 
Elbe predominated. Besides in the case of Silesia the so-called principle of pri-
macy of the landowner was adopted (as an instance, Grundeigentiimersbergwerk 
i.e. landowner's mine) 15 1, and since the Magnaten were the landowner of the surface 
of the earth, the owner of the mining-lot in the earth and generally the operators 
of the mining and manufacturing industry, in the strict sense the surplus value 
in Magnaten's hands carried a different historical character from the surplus value 
of the mining industry in Western Germany. Here we should give attention to 
13) Mikio Sumiya, AnalYsis of the Japanese Coal Industry, Tokyo 1968, pp. 425-426. And interest-
ing is the following chart as it gives a conspectus of the actual distribution of mining-lots in 1904 
among the principal mine owners in Rhine-Westphalia: Die Entwicklung des JViederrheinisch-
Wesifalischen Steirzkohlen- Bergbaues in der zweiten Hlilfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, hrsg. vom Verein fiir 
die bergbaulichen Interessen, Bd. 10, Berlin 1904, Tafel XIII. Der Felderbesitz der wichtigeren 
Bergwerkseigentiimer in Westfalen und am Niederrhein. 
14) Norman J. G. Pounds, The Upper Silesian Industrial Region, Indiana University Publication 1958, 
p.27. 
15) Zensuke Ishimura, Studies on Mining Ri.ehls, Tokyo 1960, pp. 11-16. 
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the fact that ground-rent and profit were also in Eastern Germany combined to-
gether without being separated. Now, when we consider the following facts that 
the monopolistic sway of the coal and steel industry was established in Upper 
Silesia, too, due to the establishment of Upper Silesian Pig Iron Syndicate in 1901, 
Upper Silesian Steel Works Federation in 1904, Upper Silesian Coal Convention 
in 1898, etc., that the basis for such monopoly was provided by some 10 "mixed 
works" owned by Magnaten, that the Prussian Exchequer had a monopolistic 
position, and finally that two large coal dealers in Berlin had overwhelming 
circulating control, it follows that the historical peculiarities of monopoly in the 
coal and steel industry in Upper Silesia were characterized by a monopoly of modern 
type added to the type of antediluvian monopoly while the latter was being firmly maintaining. 
Next, the type of a newly-rising key industry such as the electrical industry as 
well as the chemical industry comes to arrest our attention. The type of monopoly 
to be formed in these fields is evidently of modern monopoly on the basis of the progres-
sively higher organic composition of capital. In the field of the electrical industry 
the establishment of Siemens & Halske Co. in 1847 was the starting point. Its 
monopolistic position in Europe was secured in the section of light current engineer-
ing already in those days of the 1870's. However, this industry in those days could 
not simply be anything more than one of subsidiary sections of the iron and machine 
industry. In those days in the 1880's the section of heavy current engineering began 
to expand its operations on an ever greater scale, utilizing a series of technical in-
novations, culminating in the invention of a dynamo by Werner Siemens in 1866. 
In this way the means of mechanical mass production, spreading from the section 
of heavy current engineering to that of light current engineering, the electrical 
industry came to constitute a newly-rising key industry. The German electrical 
industry in the days immediately prior to the crisis of 1900 consisted of as many as 
27 major companies divisible into 7 groups, and in 1904 the monopolistic sway of 
the Siemens-Concern and the AEG-Concern was established. 
In the case of the chemical industry, which is another newly-rising key indus-
try, its revolution in the modes of production was realized in Germany since 1860, 
based on the development of the dye industry. On the other hand, England played 
a leading role also in the development of the chemical industry with the soda industry 
as nucleus, because the rapid growth of the textile industry in England had to make 
a sudden expansion of the soda market for the purpose of bleaching and dyeing. 
However, her monopolizing position was overthrown by the Solvay-Concern in Bel-
gium with the new invention of Ernest Solvay's ammonia-soda process in 1862 and 
furthermore her leading position in soda production also had to give way to the 
German chemical industry, in which the electrolysis soda process was adopted in 
1890. As a result of success in synthesizing new chemicals such as alizarin by Karl 
Graebe and Karl Liebermann in 1868 and indigo by Adolf Bayer in 1878, the German 
dye industry made remarkable progress, producing on the eve of the World War 
I 95,000 tons of synthesized dye out of roughly 110,000 tons of the world total 
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output. For that reason it is not without reason that as far as dye was concerned, 
"all the textile industry of the whole world, as it were, was dependent upon the Ger-
man chemical industry" 16). In such a process of development the monopolistic 
enterprises, which towered up on the foundation of the many-sided and integrated 
managements (combined management), came into existence, and two great agree-
ments of community of interests (Interessengemeinschaft) were effectuated in 1904 
between BASF and AGFA, and between HOECHST and CASSELLA. Thus 
monopolistic sway was established in the field of the chemical industry. 
(3) High Rising in Industrial Composition and the Aggravation of Contradic-
tions 
As stated above the key industry in Germany began to show its own gigantic 
features of monopoly capital in the West Elbe at the beginning of the 20th century 
after passing through the "Great Depression". Now, in such a process the high 
rising in industrial composition was made as shown in Table I from the stage of light 
industries to that if heavy and chemical industries 17). Karl Erich Born also made the follow-
ing statement: "Among German industries the consumer goods industry had yet 
the greatest weight in the 70's. Two-thirds of the factory labourers were engaged 
in the consumer goods industry and it was the textile industry that enjoyed the 
leading position in German exports of goods. During a period of several decades 
afterwards the center of gravity shifted to the iron and machine industry and their 
exports exceeded twice as much as that of the textile industry in 1913"18). In 
this connection the point, which we should not fail to take notice of, is the fact that 
with the said conversion the center of gravity of economical sway shifted from the 
East Elbe to the West Elbe. According to Hans Rosenberg, during the "Great 
Depression" agriculture lost its primacy in the whole national economy and such 
change took place in the 1880's19). 
The high rising in industrial composition during the period of the "Great 
Depression" resulted in aggravating the contradictions of the Bismarck Regime. 
In other words, on account of interlacing of the phase of the rapid shifting to the 
stage of higher monopoly capitalism in the West Elbe and the phase of the crises of 
Junkerdom arising out of the impact of the agricultural crisis in the East Elbe, the 
contradictions which were aggravated during the period of the "Great Depression" 
16) WI. Woytinsky, Die Welt in Zahlen, Bd. IV, Berlin 1926, S. 322. 
17) As it is pointed out in the detailed elucidation by Moritaro Yamada, The Stage of the Structure of 
Reproduction and Agrarian Problems in Post-war Japan, Research Material of Institute of Social Science 
of Senshu University, Tokyo 1964, pp. 1-4, it was observed in the case of Japanese capitalism that 
such high rising of the industrial composition from the stage of light industries to the stage of heavy 
and chemical industries began from about 1929-30 and was made in passing through the war econo-
my of World War II. This point is one of the most essential points which should be taken into 
consideration when the problem is to be discussed from the aspect of comparative history. 
18) Karl Erich Born, "Der soziale und wirtschaftliche Strukturwandel Deutschlands", in; Moderne 
deutsche Sozialgeschicht-e, hrsg. von Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Koln·Berlin 1966, S. 290. 
19) H. Rosenberg, op. cit., S. 39. 
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TABLE I The Structure of Employees according to the 
Stone & Metal Metal Leather Clothing 
Period Clay Preet- Produces- Chemical Textile Produc- Industry 
Industry ion sing Industry Industry tion & Leather Processing 
% II II II II II II 
1841/61 5.0 1.7 9.1 O. 8 21. 0 O. 9 23. 5 
1875 6.5 2.9 11.7 1.3 18.0 0.9 20.9 
1882/90 7.3 2.9 11.8 1.6 14.1 0.8 20. 7 
1891/1900 8.2 3. 1 13.7 1.9 12.6 O. 7 17.9 
1901/10 8.0 3.6 15.4 2.2 11.0 0.6 16.0 
1911/13 7.2 4.0 16.9 2.5 10.3 0.5 14.4 
1925/34 5.5 21. 7 3.3 10.4 0.5 13.5 
1935/39 5.3 27.3 3.6 8.8 0.4 11. 1 
1950/59 4.6 33.4 5.0 6.5 0.4 8.3 
1,000 II II II II 
I 
II II people 
1846 146 43 296 18 734 35 817 
1852 165 53 318 28 820 34 859 
1858 215 80 378 32 772 37 889 
1861 244 81 378 38 813 35 966 
1875 333 150 601 65 926 44 1,078 
1882 380 166 635 86 909 46 1,278 
1885 414 173 690 94 905 47 1,309 
1890 609 216 932 123 987 55 1,398 
1896 637 244 1,081 149 1,023 58 1,409 
1900 784 314 1,394 177 1,030 59 1,522 
1904 768 327 1,388 198 1,037 58 1,518 
1908 780 377 1,545 231 1,050 55 1,529 
1913 752 443 1,887 290 1,101 60 1, 544 
, 
1924 599 2,665 377 1, 160 64 1,482 
1928 730 2,812 387 1,302 62 1,643 
1932 354 1,491 277 823 41 1, 165 
1936 650 3, 103 410 1,060 58 1,367 
1939 821 4,544 576 1, 420 60 1,642 
1950 414 2,268 365 622 41 847 
1959 489 4, 116 618 615 41 773 
Note: All statistical figures are computed with respect to the following territories. 
(1) Up to 1870 all territories of the German empire excluding Alsace-Lorraine. 
(2) For 1871-1917 all territories of the German empire including Alsace-Lorraine. 
(3) For 1918-1944 all German territories excluding Austria and the Sudetenland, but after 
1934 induding the Saar. 
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Branchs of German Industry and Handicraft: 1846-1959 
Wood Pro- Paper Foods & Gas, 
Jewelries, 
Total: Produc- Water & Building Graphic Toys & 
cessing & tion & Beverages Electricity Trade Trade Musical In- Industry & Engraving Processing Industry Supply strument Handicraft Industry 
/I /I /I 1/ II /I /I 1,000 people 
.---~ 
10.5 0.9 14.3 O. 1 10. 6 0.5 1.1 3,676 
10.1 1.6 13. 1 0.3 10.3 0.9 1.6 5, 153 
10.0 1.9 13. 1 0.3 12. 7 1.2 1.7 6,515 
9. 1 2.1 13.0 0.4 14. 1 1.5 1.6 7,923 
9.0 2.4 12. 7 O. 7 14. 7 1.9 1.7 9,533 
8.7 2.6 12. 7 0.9 15.6 2.0 1.8 10, 742 
8.3 2.5 13.9 1.5 14.6 2.8 1.6 10,531 
7.3 2.5 12. 1 1.6 16.8 1.8 1.4 13,041 
6.5 1.9 9.5 1.7 19.2 1.6 1.4 9,827 
/I II /I 1/ /I 1/ /I /I 
361 20 455 1 338 15 28 3,305 
379 31 538 1 368 18 37 3,649 
410 45 558 6 444 23 49 3,938 
433 45 586 9 473 24 62 4, 187 
522 84 676 15 530 46 83 5, 153 
542 102 749 14 515 64 94 5,580 
599 112 827 17 648 69 101 6,005 
674 141 933 23 1,045 82 119 7,337 
718 165 1,050 29 1,088 123 135 7,909 
811 195 1,092 43 1,239 146 144 8,950 
857 211 1, 187 56 1,367 169 157 9,298 
883 245 1, 263 78 1,455 194 172 9,857 
924 282 1,427 96 1, 630 224 197 10,857 
915 266 1,435 151 1,243 234 254 10,845 
1, 116 306 1, 552 160 2,075 326 227 12,698 
574 198 1, 365 145 775 258 100 7,566 
904 279 1, 517 195 2,086 248 171 12,048 
1,061 383 1, 736 249 2,524 238 200 15,454 
634 147 867 146 1,463 136 85 8,035 
643 224 1,023 181 2,260 189 162 11,334 
(4) For the period after 1945 all territories of the Federal Republic of Germany excluding 
the Saar and West Berlin. 
Vgl. Walther G. Hoffmann, nas W",hstum der d,utschen Wirtschafts s,it d,m Mitt, des 19. Jahr-
kundert" Beriin.Heidelberg 1965, SS. 68-69, 196-199. 
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TABLE II The Structure of Total Occupation according to Classified 
Industrial Division: 1849-1959 
, 
I Com-
Agri- Other Total Min- Industry I merce, Do-





, 1,000 1/ 1/ 1/ , 1/ 1/ 1/ 
, people 
I 
1849/58(c) 54.6 0.9 24.3 1.1 5.0 9.3 4.8 15, 126 
1867/71 (d) 50.9 1.3 26.3 7.2 8.8 5.5 16,450 
1878/79 49.1 1.4 27. 7 2.0 6.6 7. 7 5.5 19,416 
1880/84 48.2 1.6 28. 2 2. 1 6.9 7.5 5.5 19,992 
1885/89 45.5 1.6 30. 7 2.3 7.2 7. 1 5. 6 21,302 
1890/94 42.6 1.8 32.4 2.6 7.9 6. 7 6.0 22,651 
1895/99 40.0 2.0 33. 7 2.8 8.7 6.4 6.4 24,277 
1900/04 38. 0 2.4 34.4 3. 1 9. 7 5.3 6.6 26,043 
1905/09 35.8 2.6 35.1 3.5 10.6 5.6 6.8 28,047 
1910/13 35.1 2.8 35.1 3.6 11.0 5.2 7.2 30,243 
1925 31. 5 2.4 37.7 4. 7 12.5 4.4 6.8 31,033 
1933 33.9 1.6 31. 0 4.9 14.6 4. 0 9.9 26,687 
1939 27.4 1.9 38. 9 5.2 12.4 3.8 10.2 39,680 
1950/54 21. 6 2.8 40. 7 5.71 14.6 2.8 11.8 21,541 


























Note: (a) Technical Staffs of the Postal Service and Railways are included up to 1913. 
(b) Technical Staffs of the Postal Service and Railways are excluded up to 1913. 
(c) Average for 1849, 1852, 1855 and 1858. 
(d) Average for 1861, 1867 and 1871. 
Vgl. W. G. Hoffmann, op. cit., S. 35. 
-- particularly the contradiction that the mutual struggle of the two antagonistic 
classes became more and more serious because of the fact that the bourgeoisie in 
the West Elbe, economically speaking, were rising to a more and more dominant 
position, while the Junker class in the East Elbe, politically speaking, was maintain-
ing its dominant position and the class nature of the state power remained unchanged 
-- came to the forefront, being spurred by the withdrawal of Bismarck in 1890. 
Now the Bismarck Regime began to trace the road of collapse. If we grasp this 
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point from the aspect of economic policies, we can see that solidarity protectionsim 
based on the "protective customs for corn and iron" in 1879 20 ) -- "compromise 
between iron and rye"21) or "alliance between »knight's estates (Rittergut) and blast 
furnace (Hochofen) (," 22) -- had to face the critical situation of its dissolution by 
the policy of "New Course (Der neue Kurs)" of Caprivi (1891-94). But it was 
not until the bourgeois revolution in 1918 that the Bismarck Regime, which was 
primarily based on the solidarity bloc of the Junker class and the upper stratum of 
the bourgeoisie, collapsed, due to the transient success Of the reorganization and 
reinforcement of the ancien regime by the "Policy of Uniting" (Sammlungs-
politik) at the meeting of the 19th and 20th centuries, which consisted of the two 
main stays of the Second Fleet Law in 1900 and the Customs Law in 1902. 
II The Social Structure of "Pseudo-BonapartislIl" 
With reference to the Bismarck Regime Shiso Hattori made a contention, 
alluding to the "Process of Collapse of Prussian Absolutism" in an article entitled 
"Absolutism" contained in Vol. 9 of the series of "Lectures on Marxism" published 
in 1928, that during the period from 1848 to 1871 a dark change of the absolute 
monarchy into "modern Bonapartistic empire" 23) or into "Bonapartism of the 
new German empire" 24) was undergone and that the transition into a modern state 
of Bonapartism was anyhow observable in the new German empire even if "many 
vestiges of the ancien system of absolutism were still found there."25) Next, Mori-
taro Yamada defined the new German empire as "pseudo-Bonapartism" and 
grasped the characteristics of the process of reproduction in German capitalism, 
which made establish the industrial capital in this regime, by considering her inter-
nal connection with the dual structure of German agriculture such as the predomi-
nance of Junker estates in the East Elbe and the continuance of peasant proprietors 
in Southern and Western Germany. He summarized the points as follows: "German 
capitalism was peculiarly characterized with the co-existence of the domination of 
Junkerdom and the sections of peasant proprietors, which composition was established 
under the rule of seeming constitutionalism [Scheinkonstitutionalismus] (1848-66) 
20) Jurgen Kuczynski, Die Bewegung deT deutschen Wirtschaft von 1800 his 1946,2. Auflage, Meisenheim 
am Glan 1948, S. 208. As to the character of these protective customs, they were already grasped 
by F. Engels as a "coalition of the bourgeois and Junker" and it was stated that the Junker had the 
"lion's share". (Friedrich Engels, "Gliederung des SchluBteils des vierten Kapitels der BroschUre, 
»Die Rolle der Gewalt in der Geschichte«(", Karl Marx· Friedrich Engels. Werke, Bd. 21, BerHn 1962, 
S. 465.) 
21) Alexander Gerschenkron, Bread and Democrac.y in Germany, Berkeley and Lm.: Angeles 1943, p. 45. 
22) H. B6hme, Prolegomena l,;U einer Sor:.ial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands im 19. und 20. Jahr-
hundert, Frankfurt am Main 1968, S. 86. 
23) S. Hattori, «The Concept of Abso1utism in Marxism", in: Absolutism, Collected Works of Shis(} 
Hattori, Vol. 4, Tokyo 1955, p. 35. 
24) Ibid., p. 28. 
25) Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
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and pseudo-Bonapartism (1870) after the secondary »provincial-Prussian(, March 
Revolution (1848), starting from the bourgeois reform (1808-13) which was forced 
to practice »from above« by the lateral pressure of Napoleon's supremacy, under 
the circumstances of the sway of Prussian absolutism during the period subsequent 
to the mid-18th century""). It seems that the following points are implied there: 
in comparison with modern Bonapartism, which had the extensive social stratum 
of peasant proprietors created by the French Revolution as its social basis, the 
concept of pseudo-Bonapartism was formed for the reason that the Junkerdom which 
came into existence through the bourgeois reform initiated "from above" instead 
of passing through the bourgeois revolution raised "from below" (von unten) lay 
as its social basis. In other words we find there a basic viewpoint that the different 
nature of "peasant emancipation" in France and in Prusso-Germany -- the 
difference in the historical nature of the land reforms -- determined the differ-
ent nature of modern "Bonapartism" and "pseudo-Bonapartism". 
On the other hand Tomoo Matsuda grasped "pseudo-Bonapartism" in the 
following three antagonisms by correlating them with the aspect of the regional com-
position of German capitalism. He maintained that "it was built up on the three 
antagonisms, i.e. the antagonism between Western Germany and Eastern Germany, 
between the industrial capitalists and labourers within Western Germany and be-
tween the Junker estates owners and agricultural labourers within Eastern Germany: 
and its social basis was composed of the old middle classes (alter Mittelstand) 
which were on the point of downfall, the new middle classes (neuer Mittelstand) 
including professionals and small producers and the Junker estates owners: these 
classes were the social basis of the German empire after 1871"27). Furthermore 
it is worthy of note that Yasushi Yamanouchi recently pointed out, as a part of his 
studies on the argument of the German capitalism held by Marx and Engels, that 
the Prussian absolute monarchy shifted to Bonapartism during the period from 
1848 to 1871 in an unmarked manner, based on the "reversed or reactionary 
reform" 28), of which essential nature could not be grasped without using a para-
doxical expression of Marx such as "the gravedigger of the revolution in 1848 was 
found to become its executor" "), and as a result the bourgeois transformation of the 
social structure could be accomplished. In this connection it must be noted that 
the grasping is made in such a way that the path "from above" of the development 
of capitalism was rooted and the way of recognizing the specific type of "German 
26) M. Yamada, Anarysis of Japanese Capitalism, Tokyo 1934, Introduction, p. 2. 
27) T. Matsuda, "The Historical Type of German Economy", in: Dictionary oj Economics, Vol. II, 
Tokyo 1955, p. 591. 
28) Yasushi Yamanouchi, Marx and Engels on the World History, Tokyo 1969, p. 235. 
29) See the followings about this expression of K. Marx: F. Engels, "An den italienischen Leser-
Vorwort zur italienischen Ausgabe (1893) des ~}Manifests der Kommunistischen Partei«", in: 
Karl Marx·Friedrich Engels·Werke, Bd. 22, Berlin 1963, S. 365; F. Engels, "Einleitung zu Karl 
:Marx' »Klassenkampfe in Frankreich 1848 bis l850«" (1895), in: Marx.Engels· Werke, Bd. 22, s. 
516. 
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capitalism which was still in operation on the decisive axis of Junker economy"30), 
of which the nature was quite different in quality from British capitalism, began 
to become matured in the thought of Engels particularly in those days after 1875. 
In this way we can find a variety in the history of studies relating to the charac-
terization of the Bismarck Regime pursued in this country over the last 40 years. 
But next I shall add some of the other views held about the characterization of the 
Bismarck Regime which were found in recent German writing. According' to 
Eckart Kehr, who has left his imperishable footmarks in the historical study of 
German imperialism, methodologically speaking, under the overwhelming in-
fluence of Max Weber and Karl Marx in the 1920's, the Bismarck Regime is grasped 
as "Bismarckian crypto-absolutism"31) or "Kaiserian absolutism"") and accord-
ing to Karl Dietrich Bracher as "monarchical de:facto-absolutism supported by a 
strict reorganized bureaucracy and a powerful army""), concerning with the his-
torical significance of German unification Wolfgang Zorn grasped the point that 
"the establishment of the empire rather strengthened that authoritativeness of 
the leading strata of the East Elbian-agrarian Prussia""). And Ralf Dahrendorf 
goes as far as to describe Imperial Germany by using an expression like "an indust-
rial feudal society with an authoritarian welfare state""). Such an expression, 
needless to say, is a mere metaphor, of which the implication is suggestive of an in-
dustrial society based on the tenacious status-hierarchy characterized by the pa-
triarchal rule effectuated by the mixture of the so-called "whip and sweetmeat" 
like the anti-Socialist Law and the Social Insurance Laws. Be the matter as it may, 
the very existence of varied views relating to the Bismarck Regime as described 
in the above does suggest to us that the above mentioned state power or, if it were 
not a floating existence, the historical nature of the social structure in the Imperial 
Germany should not be allowed to be hastily grasped as something of a modern 
or bourgeois nature. 
(I) The Mechanism of Junker-Prussian Rule 
When we glance at the political framework of the Bismarck Regime, we shall 
see that its nucleus is the mechanism of Junker-Prussian rule. The new German 
empire was composed of25 states. The King of Prussia was the Emperor (Kaiser), 
30) Y. Yamanouchi, op. cil., p. 231. 
31) Eckart Kehr, "Das soziale System der Reaktion in PreuI3en unter clem Ministeriurn Puttkamer 
(1929)", in: clers. Der Primal dey Innenpolitik, Gesammelte Aufsiilze ;:ur preuj3iJch-devtschen So:dal-
geschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Berlin 1965, S. 70. 
32) E. Kehr, "Die deutsche Flotte in den neunziger Jahren und der politisch-militarische Dualis-
mus des Kaiserreichs (1927)", in: ders., Der Primal der lnnenpolitik, S. 125j d. E. Ohno, "Btl sic 
Viewpoint of the Analysis of German Imperialism by Kehr", in: Col1ected Essays in Commemora~ 
tion of Torazo Ninagawa's 70th Birthday, Present Days' Econom.y and Statistics, Tokyo-Kyoto 196B, 
pp. 310-31 J. 
33) Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die AII,fio.wng del' lVeimarer RejJUblik, Stuttgart und Dusseldorf 1957, S. 8. 
34) Wolfgang Zorn, "Wirtschans~ und sozialgeschichtliche Zusammenhange def deutschen Rcichs-
grundungszeit (1850-1879)", in: Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte, hrsg. von H.·U. Wehler, S. 269. 
35) Ralf Dahrendorf, Gesellschaft und Demohatie in Deutschland, Mtinchen 1965, S. 74. 
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the Prussian Prime Minister was Imperial Chancellor (Reichskanzler), the govern-
ment was responsible only to the Emperor, and the Federal Council (Bundesrat), 
of which chairman was the Imperial Chancellor, was commanded by the represen-
tatives from Prussia. The Prussian hegemony in this new German empire and 
the federalistic particularism in the empire were in reciprocal relationships. This 
framework was so constructed that the Junker class holding the sway over Prussia 
by the Three-class Franchise Law such as unequal, indirect and open election 
system in the Prussian Lower House, could well protect their own interests, based 
on the above-mentioned mechanism, even in the whole empire where there was 
the Imperial Diet (Reichstag) to be operated through its universal, direct and 
secret election systems. Moreover the authoritative position of the Junker class 
had two great supports in the army and bureaucracy which formed the corner-stones 
of state power. 
(2) Junker Estates Ownership in the East Elbe 
The material foundation of the mechanism of the Junker-Prussian Rule was 
none other than the Junker estates ownership in the East Elbe, where the semi-
feudal production relations of Junkerdom -- the surplus value in the Junker's 
hands -- predominated. 
The typical categories of farm labourers on the Junkerdom were (I) the labourers 
"bound by contract" -- "Instleute", "Deputanten" and "Gesinde". (a) Instleute 
("attached labourers") meant (I) those hired by the estates owner on the basis of 
annual contracts including their whole family: (2) to whom a garden-plot of about 
I morgen (25.2 ares) in the neighbourhood of their cottages and a ridge of 1-2 mor-
gens in the farming field were alloted and crops like corns, potatoes, vegetables, 
and flax, etc. were raised on those allotments: (3) grazing privileges were approved: 
(4) wood and feed were in kind given: (5) money wages to the extent of pocket money 
for temporary works etc. were paid: (6) a certain threshing portion (Dreschanteil) 
which was a share for threshing labour in the winter as a most important earning, 
was paid and this constituted the nucleus of the community of interest (Interessen-
gemeinschaft) between the Junkers and Instleute: (7) for the above-mentioned 
rights, Instleute were obliged to work with their own scythes and flails etc. and it was 
not until such time when these instruments of labour on the part of Instleute and 
the instruments of labour like main farm implements and machines for cultivation, 
cropping, refining, and work-cattles etc. on the part of the landlord were combined 
together that the labour-process could be carried on: (8) ordinarily Instleute were 
obliged to supply one or two extra hands as subsidiary labourers (Scharwerker) to 
the landlord either by using family members or employing people from outside: (9) 
moreover all of these above-mentioned relationships between the Junkers and 
Instleute were backed up by the jurisdictions inherent in the Estates Districts (Guts-
bezirke) of the Junkers, and thus their reproduction was evidently guaranteed by 
the intervention of extra-economic pressures (au}3eriikonomischer Zwang) 36). (b) On the 
36) Vgl. 1YI. Weber, "Die Verhaltnisse cler Landarbeiter im ostelbischen Deutschland", Schriften 
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other hand Deputanten ("deputat labourers") came to the forefront after the 
mid-19th century, particularly during the period of the "Great Depression" accom-
panied with the agricultural crisis, replacing Instleute. The former threshing 
portion (Dreschanteil) was replaced then with a certain quantity of allowance 
in kind (Deputat). So, the objective conditions to form the community of interest 
(Interessengemeinschaft) with the Junkers were narrowed, the point of which 
distinguished this category of Deputanten from Instleute. (c) Similarly Gesinde 
("unmarried domestic servants") were those labourers who were "bound by con-
tract" and that well-acquainted Domestic Servant Regulations (Gesindeordnungen) 
were none other than a policy to be applicable not merely to Gesinde but also to 
all of these labourers. (II) The "free" labourers were those category of labourers 
who were temporarily engaged in seasonal work during the busy farming season like 
day-labourers. The point which we should not fail to note is the fact that, as the 
number of migratory labourers from the East Elbe to the West Elbe at the closing 
period of the 19th century increased, the number of foreign seasonal labourers 
-- particularly Polish -- began to increase gradually, taking the place of the 
German seasonal labourers. (III) In the meantime the trend of the relationships 
between the Junkers and Instleute to develop into those between the Junkers and 
Deputanten was an accommodated counter-move which was formed by reorganizing 
the former semi-feudal production relations of Junkerdom for the purpose of check-
ing the formation of the relationships between the Junkers and "free" labourers to 
be caused by dissolution of the relationships between the Junkers and Instleute 
-- in short, for the purpose of checking a transformation which might give rise 
to a capitalistic reformation of Junkerdom. This relationship between the Junkers 
and Deputanten caried a commanding significance in the labour relations of 
Junkerdom from about the mid-World War I to the time of land reform in East 
Germany of the post World War ll a7). 
Now, if we mention here the aominant rule of the Junkers ill their Estates Districts 
(Gutsbezirke) which supported production relations of Junkerdom, the Prussian local 
government law of 1853 allowed the Junkers to hold the power of police and juris-
diction in their Estates Districts"). Though the new Prussian local government 
des Vereinsfur Sozialpolitik, Bd. 55, Leipzig 1892, SS. 13-18: Ders., "Entwicklungstendenzen in der 
Lage cler ostelbischen Landarbeitcr", Ge.wmmelte Aujsiitze zurSozial~ und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Tiibin-
gen 1924, SS. 479-490. 
37) Vgl. Constantin von Dietze, Die ostdeulsche Landarbeiterverhiiltnisse seil der Revolution, Berlin 1922, 
S. 54. Dietze pointed out that the early period of the Weimar Republic was characterized by the 
formation of the unified stratum of Deputanten as the principal farm labourers under Junkerdom 
(Vgl. ibid., SS. 191-192, 227). 
Besides, speaking of the relation::;hip:s between the Junkers and Deputantcn, it should be COn-
sidered, as referred to in the Epilogue, that their historical characteristics underwent a change 
in quality after the collapse of the mechanism of JUllker-Prussian rule due to the bourgeois revolu-
tion in 1918 and the transition to the Weimar Republic and above all after the extinction of extra~ 
economic pressures which guarant.eed the reproduction of the semi-feudal production relations of 
Junkerdom owing to the dissolution of the Estates Districts (Gutsbezirke). 
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law of 1891 prescribed the incorporation of the Estates Districts into a local govern-
ment, because this incorporation required the approval from the Circle Executive 
Committee (Kreisausschu13), of which seats were institutionally occupied by the 
Junkers in majority, only 641 of 15,612 Estates Districts went out of existence by 
the time of World War 1"1. P. Molt made a statement that "it meant that the status-
hierarcy of Prussian autonomy could continue its full operation without collapsing 
until the revolution in 1918. " 401 
Furthermore, the dominance of the Junkers in the army and bureaucracy which were 
the corner-stones of state power, in spite of the development of the phenomenon of 
so-called "conversion of the Junkers into. the bourgeois" (Verbiirgerlichung des 
Junkers) "I, began to be reinforced as a result of the phenomenon as so-called 
"Junkerization of the bourgeoisie" (Verjunkerung der Bourgeoisie)4'1, or "»feudal-
38) Vgl. Peter Molt, Der Reichstag var der improvisierten Revolution, Kaln und Opladen 1963, S. 118. 
And with respect to their legislation the patrimonial jurisdiction of the feudal lords was already 
abrogated by the Regulations of 2 January 1849. 'For further information see, Kiyoshi Suekawa, 
"About the Rights of ))Obrigkeiti< of the Owners of Knight's Estates in Prussia", Ritsumeikan Bungaku, 
No. 228, 1964, p. 43. 
39) P. Molt, op. cit., S. 119. 
40) Ibid" S. 119. As to the Estates Districts see, Okio lVlurase, The Contemporary History of Germany, 
Tokyo, 1954, pp.23-24. He made the following statement: "Gutsbezirke is a political remnant 
of the feudal rule of the peasantry through Gutsherrschaft (Landlord's Estates) in the 20th century. 
Administratively speaking, its position is at a lower level than Circle (Kreis) and is a local auto~ 
nomy of low class which is on an equal with a village (Landgerneinde) or a small town. Gutsbezirk 
is an administrative unit which is independent from village administration, taxation, etc. and 
the chief executive of the said district is the Gutsvorsteher (Chief of Estates). He handles the 
administration within his district as a private affair in fact and the inhabitants there are not 
allowed to assert their rights. When his district covers more than 1,000 morgen (about 250 
hectares), this can form the regional lower police jurisdiction district (Amtsbezirk), regardless of 
the number of inhabitants there. In this case the Chief of Estates also assumes the post of the 
chief of police jurisdiction (Amtsvorsteher). He also engages in the lower court serving as public 
prosecutor's assistant. In this way, holding both administrative power and police power in his 
hand, he makes himself an absolute lord in his district, participating even in the judgements of the 
court. In addition he is held responsible for the control and administration of roads, bridges, etc. 
in his district and especially when there is a church or a school in his district, he has the patronage 
of the church (Kirchenpatronat) and the patronage of the school (Schulpatronat)." (Vgl. 
Schoplick, Das Recht der Gutsbezirke in Preufien, Berlin 1910, SS. 7 fr.). 
41) According to E. Engelberg, owing to the "revolution from above" in 1866-71 "the decisive steps 
were taken towards the gradual transformation of the Prussian feudal~bureaucracy monarchy 
into the bourgeois monarchy which was embodied in the form of the Bonapartistic dictatorship 
of Bismarck". (Ernst Engelberg, "Zur Entstehung und historischen Stellung des preu13isch~ 
deutschen Bonapartismus", in: Beilriige zum neuen Geschicht~bild, hrsg. von Fritz Klein und Joachim 
Streisand, Berlin 1956, S. 246). Moreover he pointed out that on the transition of thc form of rule 
from absolutism to Bonapartism, what is especially important is the very process of the conversion 
of the nobility, above all their upper strata, into the bourgeois. (Ibid., S. 237). When we indicate [he 
phenomenon of the "conversion of the Junker into the bourgeois", we have a grasp, having a dif~ 
ferent viewpoint from Engelberg's, that the semi-feudal production relations of Junkerdom were 
still carried on, basically speaking, even after the establishment of the new German empire. 
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izing« of the bourgeoisie" (»Feudalisierung« des Biirgertum)43). 
In the Prussian army the patriarchal relationships between officers of Junker 
origin and soldiers of 3 years' service of Instleute origin, constituted the principal 
axis. But as the flowing out of the rural population and the accumulation of the 
proletariat in towns were accelerated, the relative weight of soldiers of proletarian 
origin became greater, and the dissolution of the Insten-stratum in the East Elbe 
which had been a principal supply source of soldiers, was facilitated on account 
of the agricultural crisis which was an undercurrent of the "Great Depression". 
Thus, the Prussian militaristic monarchy shifted the supporting point to maintain 
Prussianism (PreuBentum) in the army from the former Instleute soldiers stratum 
to the reserve officers corps of the "new feudalized bourgeoisie""). After the 1880's 
the materialization of the reserve officer system was facilitated and in that way it 
was intended to make it possible to reinfore troops while maintaining Prussianism"). 
Similarly the dominance of the Junkers in the bureaucracy was reinforced46), 
and particularly marked was the development of reactionary ·policies by Robert 
Puttkamer, Minister of the Interior from 1881 to 1888: (I) coupled with the above-
mentioned policy of promoting the reserve officer system as an impetus to create 
the "type of new German feudal bourgeois"47), (II) among administrative officials 
the way of promotion to a higher rank was only open to those who had experience 
as reserve officers and among the judicial officials a policy of alienating those who 
had liberal ideas in politics was put into effect, e.g. by taking steps to reduce the num-
bers of the court of justice"). It is seen in the so-called "feudalizing of the bureau-
42) Oskar Stillich, Die politischen Parteien in Deutschland, Bd. II, Der Liberalismus, Leipzig 1911, S. 
105. 
43) F. Zunkel, op. cit., S. 249. 
44) E. Kehr, "Zur Genesis des Koniglich PreuI3ischen Rcserveoffiziers (1928)", in: clers., Der 
Primat der Innenpolitik, S. 59. 
45) Vgl. ibid., SS. 53-63. 
46) The average percentage of the Junkers in Prussia during the period covering 1888-1914 was 
reported as follows: 27% of Chiefs of Circle (Landrat): 34% of Presidents of Governmental District 
[subdivision of a province] (Regierungsprasident): 38% of Presidents of Province (Oberprasident). 
(Lysbeth Walker Muncy, The Junker in the Prussian Administration under William II. 1888-1914, 
Providence 1944, p. 191). As G. Gothein reached the conclusion that "in the last analysis Prussia 
is ruled by thc Landrat" (Georg Gothcin, Agrarpolitisches Handbuch, Berlin 1910-11, S. 453, zit. 
von L. W. Muncy, oj). cif., p. 180), the Landrat was the stronghold of the Junker class in the East 
BIbe. See O. Murase, op. cit., pp. 45 fr. 
47) E. Kehr, "Das soziale System der Reaktion in PreuBen unter dem Ministerium Puttkamer", 
in: clers., Der Primal der Innct'Jpolitik, S. 73. 
48) It is pointed out also by H. Rosenberg that such a project to secure the political uniformity of 
administrative as well as judicial offiCialdom was accelerated under the direction of Bismarck, 
taking advantage of the changing political and economic circumstances during the period of the 
"Great Depression", and a kind of personnel administration to alienate anyone who was in pos-
session of liberal intentions, was carried out in the thoroughgoing Prussian manner for the purpose 
of "unification" (Gleichschaltung), particularly in Prussia in 1880's. (Vgl. H. Rosenberg, op. cit., 
SS. 140-141, 180). 
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cracy"") or conversion of the bureaucracy into public servants in the interests of the 
"tendency towards feudalizing the bourgeoisie"50): (III) moreover the institution 
of the entailed estate (FideikommiB) began to play more and more important part 
as an impetus to expedite the "feudalizing of the bourgeoisie" or the "Junkeriza-
tion of the bourgeoisie""), coping with the increasingly frequent replacements of 
the owners of Knight's Estates (Rittergutsbesitzer) 52). 
In this way at the closing period of the 19th century the "ennoblement" (Nobili-
tierung) of the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie through the establishment of 
FideikommiBe was expedited, and by including them as the "new nobility" (Neu-
adel)") in the authoritative-hierarchal social structure of the Bismarck Regime which 
was prescribed by Max Weber as the "social preference of the landownership"54), 
Prussian land policy began to develop in order to fortify a bulwark for J unker-
Prussian rule. Max Weber concentrated his severe criticism on Prussian land 
policy"). His matter of conCern was the reorganization of the social structure of 
Imperial Germany in which the mechanism of Junker-Prussian rule was still main-
tained, and he considered that the very attempt to reform the distribution of land-
ownership in the East Elbe by expediting internal colonization and to dissolve Junker-
dom operating as a supply source of the army and bureaucracy which formed the 
corner-stones of the state power of Imperial Germany, would provide the principal 
impetus for such reorganization. It was disclosed by his analysis of the Fideikom-
miBe that Prussian land policy was quite contradictory in nature to the facilitation 
of the above-mentioned internal colonization. 
Be the matter as it may, the development of the phenomena such as the "Jun-
kerization of the bourgeoisie" or ",)feudalizing« of the bourgeoisie" in the Bismarck 
Regime implied that the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie was included in the 
mechanism of Junker-Prussian rule as the "new nobility" and that this very stratum 
of the "new nobility" was the social stratum who came to prominence with the fall 
of Bismarck as a turning point and who was a major driving force for the "Policy of 
Uniting" (Sammlungspolitik), i.e. "Junker-Bourgeois imperialism". This reorganiza-
tion of the ruling class was not what promoted the dissolution of the social structure 
of the Bismarck Regime, it was rather nothing but the materialization of the inten-
49) E. Kehr, op cit., S. 68. 
50) Ibid., S. 8D. 
51) Vgl. E. Kehr, op. cit., SS. 64-86; Yasutoshi Ueyama, "German Policy and Society I 871-1918", 
Kyoto Law Review (HOGAKURONSO), (Pt. 1-5), Vol. 83, No. 1,2,4,5 and Vol. 84, No.2, 1968; 
in addition see E. Ohno, "German Economic Policy in Transition: The Policy of Uniting (Samm~ 
lung) versus Radical Union", The Kyoto University Economic Review, Vol. XXXV, No.1, 1965, 
pp. 20-41. 
52) cr. L.W. Muncy, oj). cit., p. 26. 
53) F. Zunkel, op. cit., S. 132. 
54) M. Weber, "Agrarstatist. u. socialpol. Betrachtungcn z. Fideikommif3frage in PreuBen", 
G. A. S. S., S. 359 Anm. 
55) cr. Kazuhiko Sumiya, Friedrich List and Max Weber, Tokyo 1969, pp. 287 If. 
THE HISTORICAL STAGE OF GERMAN CAPITALISM 
tion to reorganize and reinforce the Bismarck Regime"). 
(3) The Types of Bourgeoisie 
37 
Thus we can find the principal type of bourgeoisie in the Bismarck Regime in 
the above-mentioned bourgeoisie who assumed the behaviour of pro-Junker. 
Besides, when we take note that such a type of bourgeoisie who assumed contrari-
wise the behaviour of anti-Junker carries some significance, we would like to contend 
that what is essential, is the formation of the types of bourgeoisie, i.e. if their founda-
tions of accumulation are to be further considered, then naturally the formation of 
the types of capital"), instead of allowing to grasp the German bourgeoisie sweep-
ingly as a homogeneous entity in nature. Suggestively, K.E. Born pointed out 
that, although it was possible to find a group which could be summarized by a general 
concept such as the "citizen class" (Burger tum) at the time of the establishment 
of the empire, on the eve of World War I there no longer existed such a "citizen 
class" as a status or social stratum"), and they were split into separate groups, none 
of them having any common social denominator, as a result of an intense differen-
tiation of economic, social and political interests. The following information gives 
a good indication of this state of affairs. For example, the iron and steel industry, 
the textile industry and the chemical industry had almost equal weight respec-
tively in the Central Association of German Industrialists which was a kind of 
pressure group of the bourgeoisie formed in 1875, while the greater part of the 
chemical industry and the textile industry who were disunited in 1895, formed a 
Union of Industrialists by themselves including the various finished products' indus-
try59), and setted forward different line of policies60 ). Viewed from the aspect of 
the formation of the types of German bourgeoisie, it becomes only possible to arrive 
at a rational understanding ofthe intricate circumstances under which the left-wing 
block, as widely known, "from Bebel to Bassermann" was formed on the eve of 
World War I and owing to the subsequent conversion of the Center Party a new 
parliamentary majority in the Imperial Diet, which became to be a prototype rif the 
Weimar Coalition, came into existence"). 
56) About the point that the phenomenon of the "ennoblement" (Nobilitierung) of capital was 
observed not only in Germany but also in England, but that its meaning in Germany was quite 
different from that in England, see R. Dahrendorf, op. cit., SS. 63-64. 
57) Eiji Ohno and Kazuhiko Sumiya, "Analysis of German Capitalism and l)Types of Capital(", 
Shiso, Pt. I: Vol. 476, No.2, 1964 and Pt. 2: Vol. 488, No.2, 1965; Akihiko Yoshioka, "An Analy-
sis on the »Final Report ofthe Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Depression of Trade 
and Industry, 1886«", in: Takenobu Kawashima and Tomoo Matsuda, ed., Types of National 
Economy, Tokyo 1968, p. 234. It is very suggestive for our viewpoint, that according to the indication 
of A. Yoshioka, "the question of two different lines in Britain each making an approach towards 
Imperialism -- Liberal Imperialism on the one hand and Social Imperialism on the other hand 
-- based on the mutually antagonistic interests between the {ypes of capital in the empire" is raised in the said 
report relating to the "Great Depression" in the British empire. 
58) K. E. Born, op. cit., S. 279. 
59) Ibid., S. 282. 
60) Vgl. H. Rosenberg, op. cit., SS. 149-150. 
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(4) The Types of Labour Relations 
Lastly we shall refer to the problem of the types of labour relations under the 
Bismarck Regime. Now, the following three points may be indicated as economic 
moments expediting mutual penetration by integrating the heterogeneous econom-
ic circulations in the East and West Elbe: (I) commodity circulation, particularly 
the exchange of industrial products from Western Germany with agricultural products 
from Eastern Germany62): (II) investment of the surplus value in the Junker's hands 
in Eastern Germany in West German industry through the intermediary of bank 
capital or the Securities Exchange83): and investment of part of the industrial profits 
gained by West German industry in East German land"). In this sense further-
ance of the "conversion of the Junkers into the I)bourgeois(," and "J unkerization of 
the bourgeoisie": (III) Migration of labourers. What gives rise to a problem here is 
the movement oflabourers particularly from Eastern Germany to Western Germany. 
In this movement oflabourers are found two types: the one is the type of temporary 
migrant labourers and the other the type of migrant labourers whos settle down. 
The movement to Western Germany of farm labourers away from Junkerdom in 
the East Elbe played the role of bringing down the wage level in Western Germany, 
which consequently narrowed the home market and made the extent of dependency 
of German industry upon the foreign market greater. 
In the meanwhile the movement of labourers from Eastern Germany to Western 
Germany began to be conspicuous particularly after German unification"). They 
moved from the East Elbe provinces such as East Prussia, West Prussia, Silesia, 
Pomerania, Posen, etc. first to the industrial regions of Berlin and Saxony, and 
then to the industrial region in Rhine-Westphalia. During the period of the "Great 
Depression" the number of emigrants to the U.S.A. and so forth· surpassed by far 
the number of internal migrants from the East to the West, but after the period of 
the "Great Depression" this relative weight was reversed") and a considerable 
61) Vgl. George W. F. Hal1garten, Imperialismus vor 1914, Bd. II, Munchen 1951, S. 326. 
62) Reference should be made here with respect to the facilitation to form the home market due 
to the construction of the railway network and the close correlation between the construction of 
the railway network in the East and the iron and steel industry in the West. (Vgl. W. Zorn, op. cit., 
S. 260). 
63) For the time being the participation in stock speculation for the construction of the railway 
network by the Junkers in East E1be may be pointed out (Vgl. W. Zorn, op. cit., S. 260). 
64) What should be remembered in this connection is the view maintained by Max Weber with res-
pect to the typical nature of the German bourgeoisie: he disclosed the inner relationships between 
the rapidly increasing establishment of FideikommiBe in the closing period of the 19th century and 
the "Nobilitierung" of the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie. He pointed out that this phenomenon 
has a correlation with the historical nature of the social structure of the Bismarck Regime, making 
a statement that I'the tendency of bourgeois capital towards landaquisition lies not only in the East, 
but it is a quite general tendency and it could be weakened only when the social preference oflandow-
nership came to disappear." (M. Weber, oft. cit., S. 359 Anm.). 
65) Hiroshi Fujise, Formation rif Modern German Agriculture, Tokyo 1967, pp. 4,52-453. 
66) K. E. Born, op. cit., S. 272. 
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decrease in overseas emigration and a marked increase in internal migration from 
East to West were noted"). If the inflow of migrant labourers to the Ruhr coal min-
ing region is further examined, the total number of coal miners in the Ruhr coal 
mining region originally coming from the East Elbe was as few as 16 in all according 
to the population statistics in 1861, while according to the statistics in 1893 the 
corresponding figure was as many as 34,928 and among them the total number of 
coal miners whose mother tongue was Polish, was as many as 17,919. So those 
miners originally from the East Elbe played their part next to those local miners 
from Rhine-Westphalia6S ). In this connection it should be noted that this move-
ment of labourers also played a role in the maintenance of "patriarchal (Herr-
im-Hause) labour relations". 
Generally speaking, the changes in the labour-process resulting from the progres-
sively higher organic composition of capital due to the development of modern me-
chanical industry and the advance of the division of labour in the interior of a fac-
tory tended to dissolve the subordinate labour relations of the old type and gradual-
ly caused the reorganization of the old type into rational labour relations of the 
new type and made labourers of the new type specialized in performing partial 
work, come to the forefront taking the place of the labourers of the old type engaged 
in manifold work and characterized by craftsman. Even after the transition to 
the factory system was completed, however, on many occasions patriarchal rela-
tions such as "master-journeyman-apprentice" -relations which were typically 
in a craft remained with tenacity in the form of the intermediary master system 
(Zwischenmeistersystem) or contract master system (Akkordmeistersystem) in the 
course of the reorganization of the contract system in the interior of a factory, 
and the functions of a master which were commonly described as "absolute rule 
by a master" (absolute Meisterherrschaft)69) over gang labourers (Kolonnenarbeiter) 
played the role of supporting subordinate labour relations of the old type, i.e. 
the so-called "patriarchal standpoint" (Herr-im-Hause-Standpunkt). Now, 
what played the corresponding part of the intermediate master system or contract 
master system in the interior of a factory in the labour relations in the interior of 
a coal mine, was the function of the face boss (Ortsaltester) and foreman (Steiger) 
over a miners-gang (Kameradschaft). Relations supporting labour discipline, 
which might well be called "coal mine militarism" (Grubenmilitarismus), were 
found there'~). 
Needless to say, from the closing period of the 19th century toward the early 
20th century the development of labour movements and the expansion of trade 
67) H. Rosenberg, op. cit., S. 40. 
6B) Lorenz Pieper, "Die Lage der Bergarbeiter im Ruhrrevier", Munchener VolkswirtJ'chaftliche Studien, 
58. Stuck, Stuttgart und Berlin 1930, S. 69. 
69) Conrad Matschoss u. Georg Schlesinger, Ludw. Loewe & Co. Actiengeselischajt BC1/in 1869-1.929, 
Berlin 1930, S. 69. 
70) Ernst Michel, Sozialge.schichte der industrielten ArbeitJwelt~ 4. Auflage, Frankfurt am Main 1960, 
S. 130. 
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unions came to promote gradual reorganization for rational labour relations of 
the new type 71). Yet the subordinate labour relations of the old type based on 
the "Herr-im-Hause-Standpunkt" which could be compared with Junker rule in 
the Estates Districts (Gutsbezirke) in the East Elbe, were still predominant. Otto 
] eidels made it clear, inquiring about 60 works in the iron and steel industry in 
Rhine-Westphalia at the beginning of the 20th century, that the labourers were 
only individually concerned in the matter of deciding the piece wages of the modern 
industry, the tendency to deny any collective agreement with labour organizations 
was predominant, and there existed no organized agreement about the wage rate"). 
In general, it was not until the bourgeois revolution in 1918 and the transition to 
the Weimar Republic were carried out that wage rate agreements came to be 
concluded by collective bargaining on the principle of equal rights for employers 
and employees and rational labour relations of the new type could be established. 
After the November Revolution a new stage was marked in the labour relations 
through the extensive effectuation of wage rate agreements and the enactment 
of the Works Council Law (Betriebsrategesetz) on 4 February 1920. 
Epilogue 
The German defeat in World War I resulted in the collapse of "Junker-Bour-
geois imperialism" and the mechanism of Junker-Prussian rule which had com-
posed the nucleus of the Bismarck Regime was broken down owing to the bourgeois 
revolution in 1918 and the transition to the Weimar Republic"). The full stop 
was clearly put by (I) the proclamation of the Council of People's Commissars 
(Rat der Volksbeauftragten) on 12 November 1918 and the abrogation of the 
Prussian Three-class Franchise Law through the Reich Electoral Law (Reichs-
wahlgesetz) on 30 November 1918 and (II) the signing of the Weimar Constitution 
(Reichsverfassung) on II August 1919 and its promulgation on 14 August. More-
over a series of the following measures should also be noted. (III) The' abrogation 
of Domestic Servants Regulations (Gesindeordnungen) and Saving Clauses against 
71) For example, a number of the following labour movements should be recalled: the general strike 
of moulders in 1890 which was the first one in the history of the metal workers' movement in 
Berlin: the strike of moulders in Berlin in 1904: the coal mine disputes in the Ruher in 1889 and 
1905. The organized percentage of the total number of miners after the Ruhe coal mine dispute 
in 1905 was as much as 70%: in particular about 100,000 miners belonged to the Old Union of the 
Social Democratic Party, about 66,000 miners to the Trade Union of Christian Miners, about 
25.000 miners to the Polish Craft Union and about 2,000 miners to the Hirsch-Duncker's Trade 
Union. See also E. Ohno, German Capitalism, pp. 265-266, 305, 329-330, 351-353. 
72) Otto J eidels, Die Methoden der Arbeiterentlohnung in der rheinisch-wesifdlischen Eisenindustrie, Berlin 
1907, SS. 147-149. 
73) cr. Hisashi Sekiguchi, "German Revolution 1918-1923, Some Crusial Problems: Social, Econom-
ic and Ideological", The Journal of Economics (KEIZAIGAKU-RONSO), Vol. 34, No.2, 196B, pp. 
19-55; Hisao Otsuka, "The Present and the Duality of Nationalism", in; National Economy, Col~ 
lected Works of Hisao Otsuka, Vol. 6, Tokyo 1969, pp. 314-315. 
THE HISTORICAL STAGE OF GERMAN CAPITALISM 41 
Agricultural Labourers (Ausnahmebestimmungen gegen die Landarbeiter) due to the 
proclamation of the Council of People's Commissars on 12 November 1918. There-
after organizations of agricultural labourers began to make rapid progress"l. (IV) 
The promulgation of the Reich Land Settlement Law (Reichssiedlungsgesetz) 
on I I August 19 19: Thus the lines of the land reform to divide Junker estates in 
the East Elbe was restrained and the lines of the internal colonization policy began 
to be materialized. (V) Abolition of the regalian rights (Bergregal) in Prussia 
due to the law of 19 October 1920. (VI) Compulsory Dissolution Decree (Zwangs-
auflosungsverordnung) of the Fideikommil3e (entailed estates) in Prussia on 19 
November 1920: each one of these was put into effect according to the prescrip-
tion in Article 155 of the Weimar Constitution "I. (VII) Lastly the dissolution 
of the Estates Districts (Gutsbezirke) in Prussia according to the law of27 December 
1927, which was of the most outstanding significance. This meant the fulfilment 
of an item of the proclamation of the Prussian Government on 13 November 1918 
and it was noted that it was carried out so a:s to unify and improve the administra-
tion of local governments and also to vest the rights of communal election in the 
estates-inhabitants "I. In those days there were about 12,000 Estates Districts 
which had a population of about 1 ,500,000 -- 4% of the population of Prussia 
proper"l and an area of about 8,470,000 hectares -- 29% of the area of Prussia"l. 
These Estates Districts were dissolved and were either integrated into other local 
governments or transformed into new separate local governments. Only those 
Estates Districts, to which these procedures were not applicable on account of 
geographical circumstances or some other reasons, were left as they were"l. About 
74) For instance, the total number of members of the German Agricultural Labourers' Union which 
was established in 1909 and belonged to the Free Trade Union of the Social Democratic Party, 
was no mOTe than about 17,000 in 1912 and about 10,000 in 1918, but in 1921 it counted as many 
as about 780,000. Again the total number of members of the Central Union of Agricultural La. 
bauTers which was established in 1912 and belonged to the Trade Union of Christian Labourers 
of the Center Party, was no more than about 3,000 in 1913 and about 7,000 in 1918, but it counted 
as many as about 150,000 in 1921. (C. von Dietze, op. cit., SS. 28-35). 
75) Yasaka Takagi, Sanji Suenobu & Toshiyoshi Miyazawa, ed., Collected Human Rights Declara-
tions, Tokyo 1957, pp. 213-214. 
76) Heinz Maull, Die Landgemeindeordnungen Prcllssens, 2. Aufiage, Berlin 1930, S8. 173-174. 
77) Population in the Estates Districts occupies no small weight, if compared with the proportion 
of rural popula.tion or with that of the population in the Eastern Provinces. For example, during 
the period prior to World War I, it is said that 20% of the rural population in Prussia, 36% of the 
total population of Pomerania, 28% of the total population of Posen lived in the Estates Districts 
in subordination to the landlords without having any communal autonomy of their own. (P. 
Molt, op. cit., S. 119). 
78) If about 12,000 of the total number of Estates Districts are to be subdivided according to the 
number of inhabitants, the following composition is obtainable: no inhabitants ... 269: I-50 inha~ 
bitants ... 3,118: 51-100 inhabitants ... 3,163: 101-150 inhabitants ... 2,235: 151-200 inhabitants 
... 1,276: more than 200 inhabitants ... 1,800. (H. Maull, op. cit., S. 174). 
79) Victor von Leyden, "Wandlungen im Gemeinderecht", in: Recht und Staat im neuen Deutschland, 
hrsg. von Bernhard Harms, Bd. I, Berlin 1929, SS. 329-330. 
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450 Estates Districts which were left were assumed to be mostly covered with huge 
forests"). It should be brought to our careful attention that the dissolution of these 
Estates Districts meant the extinction of extra-economic pressures which had guaranteed 
the reproduction of the semi-feudal production relations of Junkerdom, and was 
a r'!formation to demolish the basic framework of Junker-Prussian rule, together with the 
abrogation of the Prussian Three-class Franchise Law. 
H. Rosenberg also made the following statement. "The politically excep-
tional position [of the Junker class] which was connected with the Three-class Fran-
chise Law [of the Prussian Lower House] and the control of the Upper House was 
maintained successfully up to 1918. It was in 1927 that the final demolition of 
the administrative remnants of the Gutsherrschaft (Landlord's Estates) resulted 
from the dissolution of the Knight's Estates [Estates Disctricts] as independent com-
munal-and local police districts. Thus it was by the Weimar Republic that the 
big-landowners (GroBagrarier) were deprived of their aristocratic status-privileges 
and the symbols of their exclusive domination."") Therefore, it should be con-
sidered, that the change in quality of the social structure of "pseudo-Bona part ism" and 
its bourgeois traniformation were at long last carried out by the bourgeois revolution 
of 1918 and the transition to the Weimar Republic. 
In the meantime composite protective customs for agricultural and industrial 
products were established in August 1925 and monopoly capital intended to form 
a new solidarity bloc with the Junker class, besides including the peasantry in their 
bloc. This second solidarity protectionism, as it were, was formed, but the Junker 
class occupied a weaker position on the post-war stage than monopoly capital, 
while the peasants' position was then just improved 82). But the system composed 
of a compromise between the high customs tariff for corn (interests of the Junker class 
and big peasants) and the low customs tariff for feedst!!ff (interests of the middle-and 
small peasants) came to collapse in the midst of the new agricultural crisis which 
accompanied the crisis of 1929. Then the line of policy which was primarily to 
protect the interests of the Junker class and big peasants was actively carried out, 
and the extensive strata of middle-and small peasants were driven out of the framework 
of this second solidarity protectionism. For this reason a great part of the strata 
of the old and new middle classes, not to speak of those peasantry who used to sup-
port Nazi ruralism enthusiastically, turned to the Nazi camp in a landslide manner, 
and formed the social basis for the rise of German fascism. Thus accomplishing 
"a meteoric ascent" 83) in the Diet (Reichstag) election by means of a clever appeal 
to the economic and psychological interests of the social strata who were in distress 
economically as well as psychologically in the midst of that depression, above all 
80) H. Maull, op. cit., S. 174; H. Sekiguehi, op. cit., p. 36. 
81) H. Rosenberg, "Die Pseudodemokratisierung cler Rittergutsbesitzerklasse", in: Moderne deut-
sche Sozialgeschichte, hrsg. von H. -U. Wehler, SS. 293-294. 
82) cr. A. Gersehenkron, op. cit., pp. 116-118. 
83) K. D. Bracher, op. cit., S. 359. 
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the .trata of the old and new middle classes, the Nazis seized power by linking 
up with the ruling classes i.e. the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie and the Junker 
class. 
